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Introduction
Until a jury convicted him for conspiring to launder money and for
money laundering in July 2011,1 Álvaro López Tardón enjoyed an
opulent lifestyle replete with “fancy cars, seaside condos, designer
jewelry, and expensive leather goods.”2 As “the alleged leader of Spain’s
Los Miami drug gang,”3 he trafficked an estimated 7,500 kilograms of
cocaine from South America to Spain and “launder[ed] more than $14
million in illegal drug proceeds in the United States.”4 López Tardón
purchased more than a dozen Miami condos between 2001 and 2006,
using cashier’s checks to purchase the properties directly from
1.

United States v. Tardón, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014).

2.

Drug Kingpin Dethroned: International Investigation Dismantles Criminal
Enterprise, FBI (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/drugkingpin-dethroned [https://perma.cc/5RMS-AAMZ].

3.

Frederick Reese, How to Launder Drug Money: Start an LLC and Buy Real
Estate, Mint Press News (Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.mintpressnews
.com/how-to-launder-drug-money-start-an-llc-and-buy-real-estate/168778/
[https://perma.cc/YTT6-XFF9].

4.

Drug Kingpin Dethroned, supra note 2; see also Tardón, 56 F. Supp. 3d
at 1314 (“Tardon distributed multi-thousand kilograms of cocaine in Europe,
which he directly imported from South America, and caused to be
imported in to Spain. He then laundered $14,358,639.64 in illicit narcotics
proceeds from the sale of said cocaine in the United States.”).
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developers.5 Relying on illicit funds, López Tardón bought real estate
“under the name of a shell company or straw buyer, including 11
purchases” at two high-end Miami condominium complexes.6
López Tardón allegedly laundered money by importing cocaine into
Spain, then sending the proceeds to the United States using either
couriers or wire transfers to dummy accounts.7 Then, using straw buyers
and shell companies, he purchased, among other things, luxury real
estate in and around Miami.8 The FBI estimated that, between 2004
and 2011, López Tardón brought more than $26,000,000 in drug
proceeds into the United States.9
In many ways, López Tardón’s actions are textbook money
laundering.10 After obtaining proceeds from the sale of cocaine, he
5.

Jay Weaver, Miami Jury Convicts Reputed Spaniard Drug Kingpin of
Money-laundering, Miami Herald (June 11, 2014, 1:08 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/
article1965898.html [https://perma.cc/AY56-XFLU] (“Before his arrest
in 2011, López Tardón, 39, went on a wild spending spree. He snapped up
13 high-priced condos, including a $1 million-plus penthouse at the
Continuum in South Beach, and 17 luxury cars, including a 2008 black
Bugatti Veyron for $1.2 million and a 2003 black Ferrari Enzo for almost
$1 million.”); Reese, supra note 3.

6.

Jay Weaver, Reputed Spanish Drug Lord on Trial for Laundering Millions
in Miami, Miami Herald (June 5, 2014), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/local/community/miami-dade/article1965525.html [https://perma
.cc/8YRV-BKLG]. Shell companies are “set up, usually offshore, complete
with bank accounts in which money can reside during the layering phase.”
Peter Reuter & Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money 31
(2004).

7.

Drug Kingpin Dethroned, supra note 2.

8.

Id.

9.

International Drug Money Laundering Indictment Unsealed, FBI (July
14, 2011), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/miami/press-releases/2011/
international-drug-money-laundering-indictment-unsealed [https://perma
.cc/52SU-BZG5].

10.

See Ass’n of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists, Study
Guide: CAMS Certification Exam 2–3 (6th ed. 2016). “[M]oney
laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean.” Id. at 1. The
Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS)
identifies three stages of money laundering: placement, layering, and
integration. Id. at 2–3. Placement consists of “[t]he physical disposal of
cash or other assets derived from criminal activity,” and routinely involves
depositing funds with legitimate businesses. Id. at 2. Layering entails
separating “illicit proceeds from their source by layers of financial
transactions intended to conceal the origin of the proceeds.” Id. at 3.
Layering normally consists of “converting the proceeds of the crime into
another form and creating complex layers of financial transactions to
obfuscate the source and ownership of funds.” Id. The final stage,
integration, consists of “[s]upplying apparent legitimacy to illicit wealth
through the re-entry of the funds into the economy in what appear[] to be
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arranged to move the illegally obtained funds from Spain to the United
States.11 He concealed the origin of the funds through a series of
transactions that gave his wealth a patina of legitimacy—specifically,
he associated his ill-gotten wealth with a luxury car dealership and a
gourmet shop in Madrid.12 Ultimately, López Tardón integrated his
illegal funds into the licit financial system through seemingly legitimate,
if extravagant, transactions.13
Despite the volume of his internationally financed luxury real estate
purchases, López Tardón’s empire was unraveled not by an analyst
combing through spreadsheets to detect abnormal transactions—like
one man purchasing thirteen luxury condominiums—but through the
cooperation of his associates and confidantes.14 The Los Miami gang’s
scheme began to unravel when authorities apprehended López Tardón’s
Santería priest, Vincente Orlando Cardelle, smuggling cash through
Miami International Airport.15 Prosecutors relied on testimony from
López Tardón’s “one-time partner . . . to establish[] that López Tardón
was involved in drug trafficking.”16 López Tardón’s ex-girlfriend, who
pled guilty to money laundering charges related to the Los Miami drug
gang, “acknowledged investing [López Tardón’s] drug profits in Miami’s
soaring condominium market.”17 Ultimately, identifying and flipping
members of López Tardón’s inner circle, not the movement of millions
of dollars in international wire transfers through anonymous shell
companies, proved instrumental to bringing down the Los Miami gang.18
United States District Judge Joan Lenard sentenced López Tardón
to 150 years’ imprisonment.19 “After his conviction, federal agents seized
normal business or personal transactions.” Id. Integration “entails using
laundered proceeds in seemingly normal transactions to create the
perception of legitimacy.” Id. ACAMS notes that “money laundering can
be achieved through virtually every medium, financial institution or
business.” Id. at 1. See generally Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Money Laundering: A Banker’s Guide to Avoiding
Problems (2002).
11.

Drug Kingpin Dethroned, supra note 2.

12.

Weaver, supra note 5.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.; Brian Hamacher, 5 Busted in Miami Drug Money Laundering Ring,
NBC Miami (July 14, 2011, 1:20 PM), https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/
local/5-Busted-in--125576373.html [https://perma.cc/E5NV-KPVJ].

16.

Weaver, supra note 5.

17.

Id.

18.

See id.

19.

Jay Weaver, Spaniard López Tardón Sent to Prison for 150 Years in
Miami Money-Laundering Case, Miami Herald (Sept. 29, 2014),
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[López Tardón’s] illegally obtained assets, ‘including a fleet of luxury
cars and [thirteen] condos.’”20 At sentencing, Judge Lenard described
Miami as “replete with people who utilize illegal funds and live a
luxurious, unbelievable lifestyle.”21 Since the so-called “Cocaine
Cowboys” era in the 1980s,22 money launderers like López Tardón have
helped spur demand for luxury Miami real estate.23
Miami real estate is attractive to homebuyers for many reasons.
The warm weather, sandy beaches, glamorous nightlife, metropolitan
atmosphere, thriving international commerce, distinctive architecture,
and syncretic culture are among the many legitimate reasons people
choose to purchase high-end real estate in Miami.24 Although Florida is
the most popular state for foreign buyers who seek to purchase U.S.
real estate,25 five states—Florida, California, Texas, New York, and
Arizona—account for 53% of total foreign-buyer residential real estate
purchases.26
Nothing is inherently wrong with attracting customers from
overseas. In the aftermath of the housing bubble that spurred the 2008
financial crisis, Miami’s luxury real estate market flourished despite
Florida’s high overall foreclosure rate.27 Non-U.S. residents, who

https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article2296479.html
[https://perma.cc/DMB5-5KKN].
20.

Gary McPherson, Comment, Floating on a Sea of Funny Money, 26 U.
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 159, 172 (2017) (quoting Nicholas Nehamas, How
Secret Offshore Money Helps Fuel Miami’s Luxury Real-Estate Boom,
Miami Herald (Apr. 3, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/business/real-estate-news/article69248462.html#storylink=cpy
[https://perma.cc/T7M6-DDVK]).

21.

Weaver, supra note 19.

22.

McPherson, supra note 20, at 161.

23.

Id.; Ken Silverstein, Miami: Where Luxury Real Estate Meets Dirty
Money, The Nation (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/
miami-where-luxury-real-estate-meets-dirty-money/ [https://perma.cc/
VZ4M-J7T6]).

24.

See, e.g., Phyllis McIntosh, Miami, Florida: The Magic City, 3 Eng.
Teaching F. 35, 35–37, 39, 41, 44 (2008); see also Silverstein, supra note
23 (quoting an anonymous Russian realtor as saying, “Miami is a
brand. People from all over the world want property here.”).

25.

See Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, Profile of International Transactions
in U.S. Residential Real Estate 9 (2018) (noting that Florida accounts
for 19% of all residential property purchases by foreigners in the United
States; California, the next most popular state for foreign real estate
purchasers, accounts for 14% of all such transactions).

26.

Id.

27.

Silverstein, supra note 23.
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constitute a large proportion of Miami real estate purchasers,28 are more
likely than other buyers to purchase real estate through all-cash
transactions.29 In some markets, such as Florida’s Miami-Dade County,
all-cash transactions have, in some years, constituted roughly half of all
residential real estate sales.30 These characteristics also make Miami a
popular destination for potential abuse. As FinCEN’s Advisory to
Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals noted,
“[m]any all-cash transactions are routine and legitimate, [but] they also
present significant opportunities for exploitation by illicit actors.”31
All-cash transactions—those conducted “without a mortgage or
other credit financing,” pose an extremely high risk from an anti-money
laundering (AML) perspective.32 This is because the U.S. Bank Secrecy
Act and other AML requirements do not effectively cover parties to allcash transactions.33 In many instances, American “[r]eal estate agents,
brokers and developers, lawyers, and accountants and others involved
in the buying and selling of real estate are not covered by anti-money
28.

See Nicholas Nehamas, How Secret Offshore Money Helps Fuel
Miami’s Luxury Real-Estate Boom, Miami Herald (Apr. 3, 2016, 2:00
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/
article69248462.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/T7M6-DDVK]
(noting that in 2015 foreign buyers made 25% of home purchases in
Miami-Dade County); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 25
(noting that in 2018 foreign buyers made up 33% of closed sales in Miami).

29.

Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, supra note 25 (“Most non-resident foreign buyers
made an all-cash purchase (72[%]), while a smaller fraction of resident
foreign buyers paid all-cash (30[%]).”); id. at 24 (“Foreign buyers are more
likely to pay cash than all existing home buyers. Forty-seven percent of
reported transactions [by foreign buyers] were all-cash sales, compared to
21[%] for all existing home purchases.”).

30.

Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network (FinCEN), U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and
Professionals 4 (2017) (noting that, of 13,164 closed sales for single
family homes in Miami-Dade County in 2016, 4,024 were paid in cash);
Miami Ass’n of Realtors, Yearly Market Summary—2016:
Townhouses and Condos (2017) (noting that, of 13,604 closed sales for
townhouses and condos in Miami-Dade County in 2016, 8,209 were paid
in cash.)). Thus, all-cash sales accounted for 45.7% of all home sales in
Miami-Dade County in 2016.

31.

FinCEN, supra note 30.

32.

Mitchell Lincoln, ACAMS, Auditing to the Inherent Risks of
Real Estate Gatekeepers 6 (2017) (“The use of all-cash transactions
cannot be understated as a potential money laundering concern. It enables
large sums of money to be integrated into the U.S. financial system with
little to no traceability. Illicit actors who purchase real estate in cash may
utilize the property for asset preservation, rent the property to obtain
income or sell the property[,] making it difficult to trace back the monies
to their original origins.”), available at https://www.acams.org/aml-whitepaper-auditing-real-estate-gatekeepers/ [https://perma.cc/4L8M-DKYV].

33.

Id. at 5.
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laundering laws, and therefore are not required to conduct due diligence
on customers.”34 Unlike real estate transactions financed through
traditional loans, in which lenders who are subject to AML reporting
requirements must collect and maintain detailed records about
transacting parties, all-cash transactions had, until recently, entailed
no comparable requirements on the professionals who conduct real
estate transactions.35
For money launderers, real estate is an ideal laundering
mechanism.36 Through commercial and residential real estate, money
launderers can obscure the illicit origins of their funds or use real estate
to operate “legitimate front businesses, particularly if they are cash
intensive.”37 Once money launderers acquire real estate, that property
“can readily serve as collateral in further layering transactions.”38
Historically, money launderers have bought and sold real estate “under
false names [using] shell corporations.”39 Shell companies afford
numerous advantages to their beneficial owners, including preferential
tax treatment, estate planning advantages, limited liability, and
anonymity.40
The United States does a particularly poor job of regulating shell
companies. A 2011 World Bank report concluded that, with respect to
obtaining identifying information regarding beneficial ownership, the
United States was “[b]y far the worst performer of the countries
reviewed.”41 In the United States, most company-registration services
34.

Maíra Martini, Transparency Int’l, Doors Wide Open: Corruption
and Real Estate in Four Key Markets 18 (2017).

35.

Lincoln, supra note 32, at 4 (“[Real estate] professionals [were] under no
legal obligation to establish an AML compliance program, identify
customers, conduct due diligence and report suspicious transactions.”).
But see, e.g., FinCEN, Geographic Targeting Order Covering Title
Insurance Company (2018), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/
default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20GENERIC_111518_FI
NAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/755B-9E3S].

36.

See Reuter & Truman, supra note 6, at 31.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

George L. Metcalfe Jr., The Estate and Tax Planning Benefits of Shell
Corporations, 97 Prac. Tax Strategies 252, 252–55 (2016).

41.

Emile van der Does de Willebois et al., Stolen Asset Recovery
(STAR) Initiative, WBG, The Puppet Masters 92 (2011) (“Out of
[twenty-seven] service providers under U.S. jurisdiction returning a valid
response, only [three] said they asked for any form of identity
documentation, whereas the others ([twenty-four]) were prepared to form
companies without conducting any due diligence whatsoever.”), available
at https://star.worldbank.org/sites/star/files/puppetmastersv1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/US9L-CXFM].
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providers “did not ask for any proof of identification” for nonresidents
who attempted to use their services, despite the fact that companyregistration service providers are required to obtain a valid employer
identification number for nonresidents.42 Some states’ companyregistration service providers are especially accommodating to
nonresidents: “[S]ome providers in Wyoming and Nevada actually
offered to use their employees’ Social Security numbers to spare clients
the need to obtain an [employer identification number].”43 The
identification challenge is compounded “[b]ecause so little information
is collected on U.S. companies, [making it] impossible to tell how many
are shell companies and not operational companies.”44 Nevertheless,
“U.S. law enforcement consistently has indicated that the number is
high enough to cause grave concerns.”45 Money launderers value the
anonymity shell corporations afford them because that anonymity
enables them to avoid detection.46
The risks associated with money laundering through real estate are
significant. Laundered money is used to finance terrorist and human
trafficking organizations, circumvent economic sanctions, trade in
illegal drugs, and promote political corruption.47 The United Nations
estimates that the “amount of money laundered globally in one year is
2–5% of global GDP, or $800 billion [to] $2 trillion in [2017 U.S.]
dollars.”48 The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental
42.

Id.

43.

Id.

44.

Casey Michel, The United States of Anonymity 11 (2017).

45.

van der Does de Willebois et al., supra note 41, at 93.

46.

Id. at 97 (“Many corporate vehicles that are used to launder money are
established solely for the purpose of providing anonymous access to
financial institutions.”).

47.

See Richard Malish, Are Lawyers Facilitating Money Laundering?, NICE
Actimize (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.niceactimize.com/blog/arelawyers-facilitating-money-laundering-534/ [https://perma.cc/PS54-FUQK];
see also Michel, supra note 44, at 3.

48.

Money-Laundering and Globalization, U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html
[https://perma.cc/6TRX-WSPG] (last visited June 27, 2020). The $1.2
trillion range in the estimate reflects the uncertainty inherent in
estimating the scale of an activity which, by its nature, is riven with
secrecy. The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime appears to recognize the
methodological limits of estimating the total amount of laundered money
circulating in the global financial system: “Because of the clandestine
nature of money-laundering, it is difficult to estimate the total amount of
money that goes through the [money laundering] cycle.” Id. Money
laundering in such large amounts is not a new phenomenon: one 1993
estimate “put the amount of money being derived from criminal
enterprises and then laundered in the United States at approximately $300
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AML organization, identified real estate “as a clear area of
vulnerability,” noting that “[r]eal estate accounted for up to 30% of
criminal assets confiscated” between 2011 and 2013.49 As López Tardón
recognized, real estate is an especially attractive vehicle for money
laundering. In addition to providing criminals with living space, social
capital, and bases from which to conduct illicit activities, the sale of
real estate can lend the appearance of legitimacy to laundered money.50
As a result, “the purchase of real estate is a common outlet for criminal
proceeds.”51
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau
of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is responsible for
“safeguard[ing] the financial system from illicit use and [combating]
money laundering.”52 In recent years, FinCEN has taken steps to reduce
anonymity in real estate transactions. Since 2016, FinCEN has required
title insurance companies to report identifying information about
participants in residential real estate transactions over a certain dollar
threshold in select localities.53 But the limited scope of these efforts and
the ample alternatives they leave money launderers indicates that more
action is necessary.

billion annually.” See Scott Sulzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the
Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1995).
49.

Fin. Action Task Force, Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals 24 (2013), available
at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML and TF
vulnerabilities legal professionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG9J-AZXK].

50.

See id. at 44.

51.

Fin. Action Task Force, supra note 49, at 44.

52.

What We Do, FinCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do [https://
perma.cc/82X2-9Y3V] (last visited June 27, 2020).

53.

FinCEN Targets Shell Companies Purchasing Luxury Properties in Seven
Major Metropolitan Areas, FinCEN (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.fincen
.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-targets-shell-companies-purchasing-luxuryproperties-seven-major [https://perma.cc/2FPE-Z556]. FinCEN requires
title insurance companies to “fil[e] a FinCEN Currency Transaction Report[]
within 30 days of the closings of the [covered transaction].” FinCEN,
supra note 35, at 2. Federal regulations require some financial institutions
to file currency transaction reports for transactions involving the use “of
more than $10,000” in currency in most circumstances. See 31 C.F.R.
§§ 1010.311, 1010.315 (2018). Currency transaction reports primarily
exist to prevent companies and individuals from conducting anonymous
cash transactions. See id. § 1010.312; FinCEN, Casino Industry:
Currency Transaction Reporting 4 (2008), https://www.fincen.gov/
sites/default/files/shared/CasinoIndustryCTRFilings.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M8NM-RBE5] (noting that “an initial objective of the BSA . . . was
to require banks to report large cash transactions because the anonymity
of cash made it an attractive vehicle for drug traffickers, tax evaders and
persons engaged in organized crime”).
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This Note addresses the United States’ reluctance to impose AML
reporting requirements on persons involved in real estate transactions
and how this reluctance facilitates money laundering on an immense
scale. Requiring title insurance companies to report beneficial
ownership information to FinCEN is a flawed proxy for identifying shell
companies’ beneficial owners. The United States should require all shell
companies, irrespective of whether they use services provided by
financial institutions, to identify their beneficial owners to the
Department of the Treasury. Requiring title insurance companies to
report on all real estate transactions above an appropriate dollar
threshold and requiring shell companies to report the identity of all
beneficial owners are complementary approaches that together will
reduce the United States’ attractiveness as a money laundering
destination without unduly burdening financial institutions.
In Part I, this Note examines the USA PATRIOT Act’s
amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act, which require certain types of
businesses to maintain AML compliance programs, as well as the nonintuitive manner in which regulators applied these laws in the context
of the real estate industry. Part II addresses the administrative
obstacles and policy tradeoffs involved in pursuing a more robust AML
policy through title insurance companies. Part III explores FinCEN’s
approach to addressing money laundering through residential real
estate, and concludes that FinCEN’s Geographic Targeting Orders
(GTOs) have yielded valuable insights, but that requiring title
insurance companies to report on beneficial ownership information
entails significant inherent limitations. Part III also discusses the limits
to an AML approach that relies on title insurance companies, and
argues that the government should adopt a complementary approach
that addresses anonymous shell companies. Part IV argues that
Congress should pass legislation on two fronts: (1) requiring shell
companies to disclose identifying information about their beneficial
owners to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and (2) requiring the
IRS to make all such identifying information immediately available to
FinCEN. Requiring shell companies to self-report identifying
information about their beneficial owners would both reduce the burden
on financial institutions and improve the efficacy of real estate-related
AML compliance requirements. Rather than rely on imperfect proxies
like title insurance companies to provide a modicum of transparency,
legislation that looks to the source of the problem—state business
entities that provide anonymity—will more effectively address the risks
attendant with real estate-based money laundering.
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I. Development of AML Law in the United States
The United States has come under justified criticism for failing to
limit the risks associated with real estate transactions.54 Despite
pressures to conform to best practices advocated by international
watchdogs, the United States has been slow to address the risks
presented by real estate-related money laundering.55 To better examine
the origins of the United States’ institutional failures to more zealously
police money laundering through real estate transactions, an
examination of the complex relationship between legal, historical, and
economic forces is in order.
The United States enacted the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) in 1986.56
Initially conceived as a way to encourage financial institutions to
monitor their own activities, the BSA required financial institutions to
assess the risk presented by their customers and to report suspicious
activities to regulatory authorities.57 By assembling information about
potential financial crimes and centralizing it in FinCEN, the BSA gave
law enforcement the tools to prosecute domestic money laundering and
financial crimes more effectively.58 Despite initial successes in increasing
the difficulty and cost of laundering money in the United States,
“sophisticated launderers and criminals began almost immediately to
take advantage of the increasingly open, and porous, global financial
system.”59 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. government and

54.

Lincoln, supra note 32, at 4.

55.

See Kevin L. Shepherd, The USA PATRIOT Act: The Complexities of
Imposing Anti-Money Laundering Obligations on the Real Estate
Industry, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 403, 420–22 (2004); Fin. Action
Task Force & Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, AntiMoney Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures—
United States 39 (2016), available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XK8Y-9ZYY].

56.

Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.
(2018)); Robert E. Sims & Leah Castella, The USA PATRIOT Act of
2001: New Obligations and Opportunities in the Fight Against Global
Money Laundering, Andrews’ Bank & Lender Liab. Litig. Rep., Dec.
20, 2001, at 1, 1.

57.

Sims & Castella, supra note 56.

58.

Id. (noting that money laundering “investigations were hampered by the
inability to secure evidence of financial transactions and criminal activities
that occurred beyond U.S. borders”).

59.

Id. (estimating that, in 2001, “professional money launderers charge their
clients as much as 25[%] more than they did [in 1986], a fee increase that
reflects the increased risk and cost the launderer now faces in America.”).
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international organizations sought to develop methods to combat
international money laundering.60
In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act amended the Bank Secrecy Act
to require financial institutions to establish AML compliance programs
and set minimum requirements for those programs.61 The statute
defines twenty-seven categories of “financial institution,” ranging from
more traditional financial entities—such as banks, securities brokers,
and credit unions62—to “persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements.”63
The BSA authorizes the Department of the Treasury to issue
GTOs.64 GTOs are temporary orders through which the Secretary of
the Treasury may require “any domestic financial institution . . . in a
geographic area . . . to obtain such information as the Secretary may
describe . . . concerning [certain transactions and the persons who
participate in them]; to maintain a record of [that] information;” and
to report on such transactions.65 The USA PATRIOT Act extended the
maximum effective period for GTOs from sixty days to 180 days.66 The
Secretary of the Treasury may renew a GTO if “reasonable grounds
exist for concluding that additional recordkeeping and reporting
requirements are necessary.”67 Consequently, while GTOs are ostensibly
temporary measures, in practice the Secretary can indefinitely extend
GTOs.
In 2003, FinCEN attempted to define “persons involved in real
estate closings and settlements.”68 But, in part because of opposition
60.

Id.

61.

See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 352, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2018)) (amending the Bank
Secrecy Act to require financial institutions to develop “internal policies,
procedures, and controls;” designate “a compliance officer;” maintain “an
ongoing employee training program;” and establish “an independent audit
function to test programs”); see also Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311,
5318, 5312, 5326 (2018).

62.

31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(H) (2018).

63.

Id. § 5312(a)(2)(U).

64.

Id. § 5326(a).

65.

Id.

66.

Id. § 5326(d).

67.

Id. § 5326(a).

68.

Andrew A. Lance et al., Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Collect $200: FinCEN
Imposes Temporary Reporting Requirements on Title Insurance Companies
for All Cash Luxury Real Estate Transactions in Manhattan and Miami,
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.gibsondunn
.com/do-not-pass-go-do-not-collect-200-fincen-imposes-temporary-reportingrequirements-on-title-insurance-companies-for-all-cash-luxury-real-estatetransactions-in-manhattan-and-miami [https://perma.cc/9LW4-APCN].
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from groups operating within or adjacent to the real estate industry,
FinCEN temporarily abandoned the project.69 In particular, lawyers—
who routinely play prominent roles in real estate closings—and groups
representing lawyers opposed rules that could conflict with the
attorney-client privilege and client confidentiality.70 Commentators had
harshly criticized the “troubling ambiguities lurking in the phrase
‘persons involved in real estate closings and settlements’” as posing
significant practical challenges to enforcement, increasing the
compliance cost for persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements, and conflicting with the ethical duties of attorneys.71 The
legal community’s response to additional reporting requirements on
“persons involved in real estate closings and settlements” included
practical objections rooted in the logistics of real estate closings, as well
as categorical ethical objections.72

Real estate industry groups have historically opposed attempts by
FinCEN to impose additional reporting requirements on persons involved
in real estate closings and settlements, raising concerns that “AML
requirements would impose onerous burdens on the real estate industry
with no corresponding benefit to the fight against money laundering and
terrorist financing.” See Shepherd, supra note 55, at 421.
69.

Lance et al., supra note 68; Shepherd, supra note 55, at 421.

70.

Shepherd, supra note 55, at 430; see also Letter from Louis B. Guttman,
Chair-Elect, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida
Bar Ass’n, to FinCEN, at 2 (June 9, 2003) (“[T]he inclusion of real estate
attorneys within the USA PATRIOT Act [AML reporting] requirement
would . . . impose on real estate attorneys a duty to conduct basic due
diligence on the identity of their clients—which would cause clients to feel
distrustful of their attorney and would discourage clients from
communicating fully and frankly with their attorney; and . . . impose on
real estate attorneys a de facto obligation to report questionable
transactions to law enforcement authorities-thus conflicting with
longstanding rules of client confidentiality and attorney-client privilege.”),
available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/guttmann.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZP8T-FHWX].

71.

Shepherd, supra note 55, at 406. The language of 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(u)
(2018) is inherently ambiguous. Read in the broadest light, a part-time
realtor selling a modest home—as “persons involved in real estate closings
and settlements”—could be required to implement an AML compliance
program. Thus, “regulatory action is required to enumerate the persons
that would fit into this category.” Lance et al., supra note 68.

72.

See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 55; Letter from Sanford A. Weiner,
President, Am. Coll. of Real Estate Lawyers, to FinCEN, at 4 n.1 (June
9, 2003) (“Commercial real estate transactions are carefully scheduled to
close and settle to coincide with the business interests and objectives of
the parties. Delays will be costly and may threaten the successful
consummation of transactions.”), available at https://www.fincen.gov/
sites/default/files/shared/weiner.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHA6-9FTR];
Letter from Louis B. Guttman to FinCEN, supra note 70, at 2.
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Although lawyers and legal trade groups criticized the proposed
increased AML reporting requirements, the legal profession represents
a weak link in the U.S. AML enforcement program.73 But addressing
73.

See Secret Companies Allow Corrupt Cash to Flood the Biggest Real
Estate Markets, Transparency Int’l (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www
.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/secret_companies_allow_corrupt_
cash_to_flood_the_biggest_real_estate_market [https://perma.cc/
KR4J-4RDQ] (“Australia, Canada and the U.S. rely almost exclusively
on banks to stop money laundering, even though a slew of middlemen
including real estate agents, accountants, tax planners, lawyers and others
participate in deal-making. This makes all-cash deals, which do not
require the involvement of a bank and which represent a significant
proportion of high-end sales made to overseas investors, especially difficult
to track.”).
Lawyers’ peculiar role as financial intermediaries who are ethically
bound to preserve client confidentiality presents a risk for abuse. In one
exposé performed by the transparency advocacy group Global Witness, a
person posing as an adviser to a minister of a foreign government sought
advice from thirteen law firms on how best to move money into the United
States while avoiding detection. Lowering the Bar, Global Witness
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/loweringthebar
[https://perma.cc/ZS3U-5SRW]. At twelve of the thirteen firms Global
Witness approached, lawyers “suggested using anonymously-owned
companies or trusts to hide the fictitious minister’s assets,” and
“recommended using American companies.” Id. Among the attorneys
Global Witness interviewed, some “suggested using their law firms’ own
bank accounts to help prevent U.S. banks detecting who the money
belonged to; some also suggested that they themselves become a trustee
of an offshore trust and use this position to open a bank account.” Id.
Two commentators indicated that the twelve attorneys who provided
advice on how best to bring suspicious funds into the United States “made
scant effort to explore [the possibility that the requested assistance would
violate U.S. AML statutes] or to undertake necessary due diligence,”
presenting “themselves as willing enablers of transactions to conceal
ownership of assets without exploring . . . the legal limits on such
transactions.” Memorandum from John Leubsdorf, Professor of Law at
Rutgers Sch. L., and William H. Simon, Arthur Levitt Professor at
Columbia L. Sch., to Global Witness (Jan. 25, 2015), available at
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/loweringthebar [https://perma.cc/
ZS3U-5SRW].
The norms of confidentiality that shroud the legal profession mean
that “conduct such as that of these lawyers would not normally come to
light.” Id. Striking a balance between preserving the attorney-client
relationship and preventing the laundering of illicit funds through real
property implicates policy choices about, among other things, privacy,
administrative efficiency, criminal justice, and legal ethics. Though this
Note focuses primarily on reducing the anonymity that facilitates money
laundering through real estate, an updated discussion is necessary of how
best to address the money laundering risks presented by attorneys. See
Shepherd, supra note 55, at 420–22 (discussing the risks for attorneys
related to money laundering); see also Armen Adzhemyan & Susan M.
Marcella, “Better Call Saul” if You Want Discoverable Communications:
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this weakness directly through the imposition of reporting requirements
on attorneys threatened to substantially increase the risk and expense
of compliance for attorneys without concomitantly reducing the risks of
money laundering.74 As one commentator noted, “lawyers may not be
in the best position to detect money laundering and terrorist financing
activities.”75
Recognizing the high potential costs of including attorneys within
the definition of “persons involved in real estate closings and
settlements,” and seemingly acknowledging challenges the real estate
industry faced in the wake of the Great Recession, FinCEN for more
than a decade avoided imposing potentially burdensome regulatory
requirements on the real estate industry.76 Until 2016, FinCEN broadly
exempted persons involved in real estate closings and settlements from
AML reporting requirements imposed on other financial institutions.77

The Misrepresentation of the Attorney-Client Privilege on Breaking Bad,
45 N.M. L. Rev. 477, 479 (2015) (addressing the circumstances in which
“a lawyer’s involvement with a legitimate business transaction using illicit
funds vitiate[s] the attorney-client privilege”).
74.

Shepherd, supra note 55, at 434 n.140 (“[A] real estate lawyer may be
retained to play a tangential role as special or local counsel in reviewing
and commenting on transaction documents prepared by others or in
delivering a legal opinion on the enforceability of a transaction document
under local law, or in performing solely property-related due diligence
investigations (such as title and survey review or analysis of zoning
entitlements). In none of these types of activities is the lawyer likely to
find, or even be in a position to discover, potential ‘red flags’ suggesting
that one or more of the parties may be seeking to engage in money
laundering or may be providing financial support for terrorist activities.”)
Without a “demonstrable cost-benefit to such an undertaking,” an
interpretation of 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(U) (2018) that excludes many
attorneys who participate in real estate transactions would avoid undue
compliance costs. See Letter from Sanford A. Weiner to FinCEN, supra
note 72, at 8.

75.

Shepherd, supra note 55, at 434 & n.140.

76.

Lance et al., supra note 68. (“Because most real estate transactions
involve some form of financing, and are thus subject to the AML scrutiny
imposed by financial institutions, FinCEN has been reluctant to impose
potentially duplicative requirements on the rest of the industry.”).

77.

Martini, supra note 34, at 18 (“The USA PATRIOT ACT 2001 originally
contained provisions that required those involved in real estate closings
to perform due diligence on their customers, but they were granted a
temporary exemption from that requirement by the Treasury Department,
which has never been lifted.”); see also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.205(b)(1)(v)
(2018) (exempting “[persons] involved in real estate closings and settlements”
from the requirement to “establis[h] anti-money laundering programs”).
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II. Modern Developments: Using GTOs to Require
Title Insurance Companies to Perform Reporting and
Recordkeeping Functions
The policy of broadly exempting persons involved in real estate
closings and settlements from AML reporting requirements shifted on
January 13, 2016, when FinCEN issued two GTOs “requiring [title
insurance companies, their subsidiaries and agents] to collect and report
information about the persons involved in certain residential real estate
transactions” in Miami-Dade County and Manhattan.78 Finding
that “additional reporting requirements . . . are necessary to carry out
the purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act,” FinCEN used the GTO
mechanism to create additional recordkeeping and reporting
requirements on title insurance companies.79 The January 2016 GTOs
covered “real property (including individual units of condominiums and
cooperatives) designed principally for the occupancy of from one to four
families.”80
The January 2016 GTOs defined “covered transactions,”
enumerating the kinds of legal entities and financial instruments,
geographic locations, and purchase prices that would trigger reporting
requirements for title insurance companies on customers who lack
external financing.81 The GTOs required title insurance companies that
conduct covered transactions to report to FinCEN all such transactions

78.

FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting
Order: Miami (2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/
Real_Estate_GTO-MIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZQ6-JDUP] [hereinafter
FinCEN, Miami GTO]; FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
Geographic Targeting Order: Manhattan (2016), https://www.fincen
.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real_Estate_GTO-NYC.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BXL4-JYYZ] [hereinafter FinCEN, Manhattan GTO].

79.

FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 1; FinCEN Manhattan GTO,
supra note 78, at 1.

80.

Frequently Asked Questions, FinCEN (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.fincen
.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FAQsRealEstateGTO.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6UEW-MM2Y]. Thus, real estate transactions for any other type of
property are not subject to reporting requirements.

81.

FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 1–2; FinCEN Manhattan
GTO, supra note 78, at 1–2. A transaction was a “covered transaction”
for the purposes of the GTOs if: (1) a legal entity (2) purchases residential
real property located in [the selected county or borough] (3) for a total
purchase price in excess of [$1,000,000 in Miami-Dade County; $3,000,000
in the Borough of Manhattan], (4) such purchase is made without a bank
loan or other similar form of external financing, and (5) it is made, at
least in part, using currency or a cashier’s check, a certified check, a
traveler’s check, or a money order in any form. FinCEN Miami GTO,
supra note 78; FinCEN Manhattan GTO, supra note 78.
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within thirty days of completing the transaction.82 FinCEN required
title insurance companies to collect and transmit “information about
the identity of the individual primarily responsible for representing the
Purchaser, . . . the identity of the Purchase, . . . [and] the identity of
the beneficial owner(s) of the Purchaser.”83 Significantly, FinCEN
defined “beneficial owner” to mean “each individual who, directly or
indirectly, owns 25% or more of the equity interest in the Purchaser.”84
FinCEN also required title insurance companies to include the closing
date, the address, the total purchase price, and the “amount transferred
in the form of a [monetary instrument].”85 These requirements did not
preclude cash purchases for expensive residential real property.86
Rather, these requirements compelled individuals and the beneficial
owners of limited-liability corporations and other corporations “to
identify themselves to authorities.”87
Then-FinCEN Director Jennifer Shasky Calvery justified the
January 2016 GTOs as part of an effort “to understand the risk that
corrupt foreign officials, or transnational criminals, may be using

82.

FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 2; FinCEN Manhattan GTO,
supra note 78, at 2.

83.

FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 2; FinCEN Manhattan GTO,
supra note 78, at 2. FinCEN defined “Purchaser” to mean “the [legal
entity] that is purchasing residential real property as part of a Covered
Transaction.” E.g., FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78 at 3. Beneficial
owners covered in the GTOs include “each individual who, directly or
indirectly, owns 25% or more of the equity interest in the Purchaser.”
E.g., FinCEN Miami GTO supra note 78 at 3. Twenty-five percent has
remained the beneficial-ownership threshold necessary to trigger reporting
obligations. Frequently Asked Questions, FinCEN (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20G
TO%20FAQs_111518_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM2S-EWV6].

84.

FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 3; FinCEN Manhattan GTO,
supra note 78, at 3; Rena S. Miller & Liana W. Rosen, Cong.
Research Serv., IF11014, Implementation of Treasury’s New
Customer Due Diligence Rule: A Step Toward Beneficial
Ownership Transparency? (2018).

85.

E.g., FinCEN Miami GTO, supra note 78, at 2–3.

86.

Nicholas Nehamas & Rene Rodriguez, How Dirty Is Miami Real Estate?
Secret Home Deals Dried Up when Feds Started Watching, Miami
Herald (July 18, 2018, 6:59 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
business/real-estate-news/article131543514.html [https://perma.cc/G4853TTU].

87.

C. Sean Hundtofte & Ville Rantala, Anonymous Capital Flows and U.S.
Housing Markets 1 (May 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186634 [https://perma.cc/
59Z3-5Q3P]. It bears mention that “[o]nly government officials have
access to the information [about the identities of beneficial owners in
residential real estate transactions], not the public.” Nehamas &
Rodriguez, supra note 86.
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premium U.S. real estate to secretly invest millions in dirty money.”88
Although FinCEN’s “rules [had] evolved to make the standard
mortgage market more transparent and less hospitable to fraud and
money laundering, . . . cash purchases present a more complex gap.”89
FinCEN’s decision to focus on title insurance companies stemmed from,
in its view, the “central role” that title insurers play in residential real
estate transactions.90 Title insurance companies protect parties to real
estate transactions “against losses resulting from unknown defects in
the title to [real] property that occur prior to the closing of a real estate
transaction” by “cover[ing] the insured party for any covered losses and
legal fees that might arise” from title defects.91 Thus, title insurers are
routinely involved in real estate transactions.92 The choice to regulate
title insurance companies both directs attention to actors who often
feature prominently in real estate transactions and avoids the
contentious debate over whether to subject attorneys and realtors to
the reporting requirements.
The January 2016 GTOs remained in effect from March 1, 2016
through August 27, 2016.93 Subsequent GTOs expanded the
geographical reach, lowered the purchase-price threshold, and
broadened the list of financial instruments subject to the reporting
requirements.94 The November 2018 GTO required title insurance
88.

FinCEN Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami,
FinCEN (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/news_
release/20160113.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY3N-BPTB].

89.

Id.

90.

Id. (“FinCEN is covering certain title insurance companies because title
insurance is a common feature in the vast majority of real estate
transactions.”).

91.

Title Insurance, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_title_insurance.htm [https://
perma.cc/5H3G-5SYG].

92.

FinCEN Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami,
supra note 88. Lenders “have shown a strong preference for the use of title
insurance in their lending operations.” Harry Mack Johnson, The Nature
of Title Insurance, 33 J. Risk & Ins. 393, 410 (1966).

93.

FinCEN Manhattan GTO, supra note 78, at 3; FinCEN Miami GTO,
supra note 78, at 3.

94.

See, e.g., FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic
Targeting Order: Sample (2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/
files/shared/Title_Ins_GTO_Sample_072716.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4L7A-XNQW] (expanding the monetary instruments covered by the order
to include personal checks and business checks, and extending the
geographic reach of the order to include additional counties and boroughs
in Florida, New York, Texas, and California); FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of
the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order: Generic (2017),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20G
TO%20February%202017%20-%20Generic.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ7L-
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companies to report to FinCEN identifying information for parties
involved in transactions for any non-financed residential real property
with a purchase price of $300,000 or more that take place in one of
twenty-two counties in nine states.95 Subsequent GTOs have included
minor adjustments, but the geographic scope, dollar amount, and
ownership thresholds remain unchanged and are in effect through
November 2020.96
HBW7]; FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic
Targeting Order: Generic (2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/
default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20Order%20-%208.22.17%
20Final%20for%20execution%20-%20Generic.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6D8FNLD] (subjecting funds transfers, such as wire transfers or automated
clearing house transfers, to the order, and extending the geographic reach
of the order to include the city and county of Honolulu, Hawaii); FinCEN,
supra note 35 (dramatically lowering the dollar threshold for reporting,
expanding the geographic scope of the order, and subjecting transactions
funded by virtual currency to the order).
95.

FinCEN, supra note 35, at 1–2. The November 2018 GTO covers
transactions in the following localities:
1. The Texas counties of Bexar, Tarrant, or Dallas;
2. The Florida counties of Miami-Dade, Broward, or Palm Beach;
3. The Boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, Bronx, Staten Island, or
Manhattan in New York City, New York;
4. The California counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, San Mateo, or Santa Clara;
5. The City and County of Honolulu in Hawaii;
6. The Nevada county of Clark;
7. The Washington county of King;
8. The Massachusetts counties of Suffolk, or Middlesex; or
9. The Illinois county of Cook . . . .
Id.
Preliminary data suggests that approximately 57% of all new houses
sold in 2018 sold for $300,000 or more. U.S. Census Bureau & U.S.
Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., Monthly New Residential Construction
January 2019 (2019), https://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/pdf/
newresconst.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7J2-D87X]. As of January 2019, the
median sale price for new residential housing sales was $317,200. Id. The
median sale price for existing single-family home sales was somewhat
lower—$249,400—during the same time period. See Median Sales Price
of Existing Single-Family Homes, Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis (Feb
21, 2019) https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HSFMEDUSM052N [https://
perma.cc/GC2J-WKZD]. The $300,000 reporting threshold is thus likely
to capture a significant portion of all future residential real estate sales
throughout the country.

96.

See FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order
Covering Title Insurance Company (May 14, 2019), https://www.fincen.gov/
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FinCEN’s decision to subject to additional scrutiny non-financed
residential real estate transactions has generated useful information on
the money laundering risks posed by real property sales.97 During the
first year it monitored such transactions, FinCEN “found that about
30[%] of the transactions covered by the GTOs involve a beneficial
owner or purchaser representative [who] is also the subject of a previous
suspicious activity report.”98 FinCEN concluded that the proportion of
suspicious-activity-report filings against people who conduct cash-based
transactions for high-end real estate “corroborates FinCEN’s concerns

sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20Order%20FINAL
%20GENERIC%205.15.2019_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF37-W7T2]
(extending the November 2018 GTO without changes); FinCEN, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order Covering Title Insurance
Company (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/
fincen-reissues-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-12-metropolitan-areas-0
[https://perma.cc/E85P-FC8G] (exempting real estate transactions made
by publicly traded U.S. companies but otherwise continuing the previous
GTO); FinCEN, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Geographic Targeting Order
Covering Title Insurance Company (May 8, 2020), https://www.fincen
.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Generic%20Real%20Estate%20GTO%20
Order%20FINAL%20508_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WQL-W7QQ] (extending
November 2019 GTO without changes).
97.

See, e.g., FinCEN Renews Real Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” to
Identify High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, FinCEN
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/201702/Renewed%20GTO%20NR%20FINAL%20%28Posting%29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C88W-8UPJ].

98.

Id. Suspicious activity reports are the vehicle through which financial
institutions “report known or suspected violations of law or suspicious
activity.” FinCEN, Guidance on Preparing a Complete & Sufficient
Suspicious Activity Report Narrative 1 (2003). Suspicious activity
reports “have been instrumental in enabling law enforcement to initiate
or supplement major money laundering or terrorist financing investigations
and other criminal cases” and give FinCEN “a method of identifying
emerging trends and patterns associated with financial crimes.” Id.
Financial institutions are required to file suspicious activity reports in
several circumstances, such as when they detect activity that “[m]ay
involve potential money laundering or other illegal activity.” Kathryn
Reed Edge, SARs and PEPs, Tenn. B.J., Aug. 2018, at 26, 26. Being the
subject of a suspicious activity report is not prima facie evidence of
financial crime; rather, suspicious activity reports “are intended to report
certain financial transactions that the financial institution making the
filing knows or reasonably suspects may violate Federal criminal law or
that relate to money laundering activity or a violation of the [Bank
Secrecy Act].” Alex C. Lakatos & Mark G. Hanchet, Confidentiality of
Suspicious Activity Reports, 124 Banking L.J. 794, 794 (2007). Because
“banks tend to err on the side of reporting, rather than ignoring marginal
activity,” suspicious activity reports may reflect financial institutions’ risk
aversion more than wrongdoing on the customer’s part. See id. at 795.
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about the use of shell companies to buy luxury real estate in ‘all-cash’
transactions.”99
FinCEN’s implementation and subsequent expansion of reporting
requirements for title insurance companies has “produc[ed] valuable
data that is assisting law enforcement and is serving to inform
[FinCEN’s] future efforts to address money laundering in the real estate
sector.”100 A 2018 study found that by requiring the title insurance
companies to report to FinCEN the identities of individuals who own
25% or more of a company conducting a cash transaction for residential
real estate, FinCEN introduced scrutiny to an arena that had
historically received little attention.101 Removing some of the anonymity
afforded to business entities in the residential real estate market made
possible the first meaningful estimates of the value that purchasers in
that market ascribe to anonymity.102 By one estimate, limiting the
anonymity of residential real estate transactions reduced the volume of
cash-based shell-company purchases of residential real estate in by
roughly 70%.103 Limiting the anonymity available to business entities
did not measurably reduce the total volume of residential real estate
purchases.104 This observation has supported speculation that when “the
demand from corporate buyers falls, it is possible that other buyers may
replace them, and some anonymity-seeking buyers may start buying in
their own name or [using] alternative methods to hide their identity.”105
All the same, before the implementation of the GTOs, “[t]he evidence
on the whole suggests that anonymity-preferring buyers made up the
majority of corporate cash purchases in the U.S.”106 As a result of the
GTOs, corporate purchasers of residential real estate have changed
their behavior: “When buyers are not able to hide their identity from

99.

FinCEN Renews Real Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” to Identify
High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, supra note 97.
Though it captures an aspect of the transactions in question, the “allcash” label is misleading: Residential real estate transactions that meet
the GTOs’ other requirements are covered “[i]f any part of the purchase
price was made using a method of payment specified in [the GTO].”
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 80. It would be more accurate to
say that such transactions are non-financed, or fully liquid.

100. FinCEN Renews Real Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” to Identify
High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas, supra note 97.
101. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 3–4.
102. See Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 1.
103. Id. at 18 (“[A]ll-cash corporate acquisitions start off at approximately 10%
of total purchases by dollar volume, then they fall to approximately 2.5%
of total volume.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 23.
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U.S. authorities, these anonymous capital flows mostly disappear and
are accompanied by coincident declines in premium housing prices.”107
Reducing shell companies’ ability to maintain anonymity for their
beneficial owners has produced potentially negative externalities, as
well. Preliminary “findings indicate that the market value of luxury
properties has decreased by billions of dollars, and particularly in the
areas most affected by regulation.”108 But the reduction in property
values in covered localities has neither an unequivocally positive nor
negative moral or political quality. While a lower premium for luxury
real estate may subvert investor expectations and lead to reduced tax
receipts, this same shift may make housing “more affordable to local
residents.”109

III. Limits to Enlisting Title Insurance Companies in
the Quest to Prevent Real Estate-based Money
Laundering
Despite FinCEN’s improving understanding of both real estatebased money laundering and the extended reach of the GTOs,
considerable gaps in that understanding remain.110 The GTOs’ limited
geographic scope, the ease with which money launderers can avoid the
beneficial-ownership-reporting threshold, the fact that the GTOs apply
only to transactions for which parties purchase title insurance, the
failure to include trusts under the GTOs, and the focus on residential
real estate to the exclusion of commercial properties all represent
exploitable gaps in the GTOs.111

107. Id.
108. Id. at 23.
109. Id. For example, the prevalence of luxury real estate in Miami and its
power to attract foreign investors in real estate have contributed to
making Miami “one of the least affordable cities in the United States—
and one of the least affordable in the English-speaking world.” Nicholas
Nehamas, Buying a Home in Miami-Dade Is So Expensive, It Could Hurt
the Economy, Miami Herald (Feb. 9, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www
.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article131543514.html
[https://perma.cc/G485-3TTU]. In any event, relying on anonymously
purchased housing to prop up the residential real estate market runs the
risk of enlisting entire communities in preserving the corruption, drug
trafficking, human trafficking, tax evasion, and terrorist financing that
are often the impetus for money laundering. See generally Reuter &
Truman, supra note 6.
110. See, e.g., Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 11.
111. See id. (identifying trusts, using a greater number of small dollar
purchases, avoiding the use of title companies, and avoiding jurisdictions
covered by GTOs as ways for money launderers to avoid the GTOs).
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A. Narrow Geographic Reach

The GTOs do not have a broad enough geographic footprint to
prevent money laundering through residential real estate. Although the
GTOs have subjected residential real estate in select areas to
unprecedented scrutiny, residential real estate outside of those areas is
currently beyond regulators’ reach.112 Little differentiates a residential
property in Chicago from a similarly priced property in Washington,
D.C., yet residential property in the nation’s capital is not subject to
the current GTO’s reporting requirement.113 The GTOs have performed
a valuable diagnostic function in singling out select urban localities for
additional scrutiny.114 But despite their diagnostic utility, the GTOs’
focus on discrete geographic areas seems more likely to displace, rather
than prevent, money laundering through residential real estate unless
they are extended throughout the country.115
B. High Beneficial Ownership Requirement

The November 2018 GTO, like its predecessors, requires title
insurance companies to report identifying information on the natural
persons who are the beneficial owners of 25% or more of a shell
company.116 In 2016, the Department of the Treasury considered a rule
that would have required some financial institutions to disclose the
identity of beneficial owners who own 10% or more of any included legal
entity after receiving comments from “non-governmental organizations
and many individuals [who] asserted that the proposed 25[%] ownership
threshold is too high and that it should be lowered to 10[%] (or
eliminated entirely) in the final rule.”117 But in the face of opposition
112. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 1–2. Residential real estate outside of the
counties and boroughs enumerated in the GTOs is logically excluded from
the Nov. 2018 GTO’s coverage.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87.
115. The concept that areas outside of major metropolitan areas are subject to
less scrutiny from law enforcement and regulatory bodies has spread to
popular culture. See, e.g., Ozark, Season 1, Episode 1 (Netflix July 21,
2017), https://www.netflix.com/watch/80117807?trackId=13752289&tctx=
0%2C0%2C721ea219-6066-4fa8-969f-739e1cf23d3f-511708524%2C%2C
[https://perma.cc/WC2P-DRSS] (“You’re right about Chicago. You got
the FBI and the ATF and the CIA and they’re all . . . they’re circling
around Chicago. And they’re tapping phones, and they’re monitoring
bank accounts, and I just . . . . We need a new hub. I need a new hub. Okay?
This place [rural Missouri]. It’s away from every single law enforcement
agency in the U.S. and it’s cash rich.”).
116. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 4; see also sources cited supra note 94.
117. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81
Fed. Reg. 29,398, 29,403 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
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from private-sector commenters, the Department declined to lower the
threshold for beneficial ownership to 10%.118 The Treasury
Department’s less aggressive approach to identifying the beneficial
owners of legal entities, as some commenters noted, makes it easier for
money launderers to avoid disclosure requirements.119 By dispersing
beneficial ownership of a company equally between five or more
individuals, enterprising anonymity seekers could avoid the November
2018 GTO’s reporting requirements.120
C. Properties Without Title Insurance

Residential real estate buyers who do not purchase title insurance
are not subject to the November 2018 GTO.121 Lenders often require
purchasers to obtain title insurance as a condition to issuing
mortgages.122 Because “[t]itle insurance protects real estate
purchasers . . . from losses that arise after a real estate settlement, but
result from unknown liens, encumbrances or other defects [of] the title
that existed prior to settlement,” ordinary prudence leads many cash
buyers to obtain title insurance.123 But all-cash purchasers may choose
to forego title insurance and assume the “unusual but serious perils” of
obtaining a defective title.124 “[E]xcluding title companies from
118. Id. While 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (2018) does not cover persons involved in real
estate closings and settlements, the experience of attempting to regulate
other financial institutions may inform future attempts to impose more
extensive reporting obligations.
119. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 29,410. FinCEN noted that commenters “urged FinCEN to lower
this threshold to 10[%], contending that the higher threshold would be
too easy to evade and is inconsistent with international AML norms and
requirements of [the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act]” because “this
lower threshold would make it more difficult for illicit actors to structure
ownership interests to evade the reporting threshold.” Id. But FinCEN
declined to adopt the 10% ownership threshold in its final rule, noting
that the practice of “collect[ing] beneficial ownership information at a
threshold lower than 25[%] . . . is [not] widely established enough to
justify its categorical imposition for all legal entity customers across all
covered financial institutions.” Id.
120. Id.
121. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 1, 3.
122. See, e.g., Md. Ins. Admin., A Consumer Guide to Title Insurance 1
(2019), available at https://insurance.maryland.gov/consumer/documents/
publications/titleinsurancebrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC9D-4DCW].
123. Id.
124. Johnson, supra note 92. More than other purchasers of real property,
money launderers and organized criminals may be uniquely wellpositioned to self-insure in the event that they obtain defective title to
real property, whether by employing parties to conduct title searches
independently or by intimidating parties into not asserting their rights to
the property.
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transactions by declining to purchase title insurance” remains a
“potential means of working around” the GTO.125 An analysis of
residential real estate transactions in jurisdictions subject to the GTOs
found “evidence of statistically significant short-run substitution away
from title insurance.”126 Researchers identified as much as a “25% initial
increase in purchases without title insurance” immediately following the
implementation of the GTOs.127 FinCEN “cannot impose any regulation
directly on buyers,” but instead must regulate financial institutions.128
Although making title insurance companies the center of the GTOs was
a sensible starting point for identifying the natural persons behind
residential real estate transactions, buyers committed to maintaining
anonymity are still able to do so—and will be able to do so even if
FinCEN extends the reach of the GTOs throughout the country.
D. Failure to Cover Trusts

Furthermore, legal arrangements like trusts are excluded from the
definition of “legal entity” under the GTOs and could be used to thwart
the purposes of the GTO.129 In 2016, FinCEN clarified that “[a]ll trusts,
no matter the purpose, are outside the definition of a legal entity under

125. Rebecka Manis & Kaitlin Riley Duran, Update: FinCEN Issues Revised
Regulations that Aim to Discover and Prevent Money Laundering, Schiff
Hardin (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.schiffhardin.com/insights/publications/
2018/update-fincen-issues-revised-regulations-that-aim-to-discover-andprevent-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/U5XX-JLCT]. Declining to
obtain title insurance “may trigger a duty [for attorneys] to inquire into
whether . . . the seller is prohibited from doing business with [the
purchaser].” Id. at n.15. But parties to residential real estate transactions
who are not represented by counsel are not subject to this additional layer
of scrutiny. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 11.
126. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 21–22.
127. Id. at 22 (noting that this phenomenon “recedes to a statistically insignificant
+18% when a county-price bracket is under a GTO”).
128. Id. at 9 (observing that FinCEN is only authorized to “issue geographic
targeting orders for financial institutions); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)
(2018).
129. See FinCEN, supra note 35, at 4. FinCEN has justified this different
treatment on the grounds that the government does not need to be
involved in forming a trust:
[U]nlike [other] legal entities . . . , a trust is a contractual
arrangement between the person who provides the funds or other
assets and specifies the terms . . . and the person with control over
the assets . . . , for the benefit of those named in the trust
deed . . . . Formation of a trust does not generally require any
action by the state.
Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed.
Reg. 29,398, 29,412 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010,
1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).
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the GTO.”130 “The type of trustee, individual or corporate, does not”
affect whether a trust is subject to a GTO’s requirements.131 In similar
circumstances, FinCEN has reasoned that, with respect to trusts and
other legal arrangements, financial institutions “may need to take
additional steps to verify the identity of a customer that is not an
individual, such as obtaining information about persons with control
over the account.”132 But the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental body of which the United States is a member,133
found that “[t]he U.S. is an attractive destination for domestic and
foreign proceeds” in part because “most trustees . . . are not subject to
comprehensive [AML and counter-terrorist financing] requirements.”134
Although money launderers have routinely used legal entities in
complex schemes, “[t]o a much lesser extent, trusts have been identified
in complex [money laundering] schemes.”135 In its most recent report on
money laundering risks in the United States, the FATF noted that
“there is currently no estimate of the number, size [or] activity of U.S.
trusts as these are not created by governments.”136 The FATF observed
that trusts were “used to obfuscate the source, ownership, and control
of illegal proceeds.”137 But despite the challenge that trusts present to
law enforcement, the FATF concluded that “[n]o mechanism is
realistically available to authorities to collect [beneficial ownership]
information on legal arrangements from the trustee or other parties.”138
The FATF’s recognition that trusts present significant money
laundering risks highlights the need for additional action to reduce that
risk. Indeed, the FATF has called for the United States to implement

130. FinCEN Addresses GTO Questions, Am. Land Title Ass’n (Sep. 13,
2016), https://blog.alta.org/2016/09/fincen-addresses-gto-questions.html
[https://perma.cc/J2XA-N5WD].
131. Id.
132. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed.
Reg. at 29,412 (quoting Customer Identification Programs for Broker-Dealers,
68 Fed. Reg. 25,113, 25,116 n.30 (May 9, 2003) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pt. 103)).
133. Members and Observers, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatfgafi.org/about/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 [https://perma.cc/
BK5S-MMYN] (last visited June 27, 2020).
134. Fin. Action Task Force & Asia-Pacific Group on Money
Laundering, supra note 55, at 18.
135. Id.
136. Id. The FATF observed that “the [Bank Secrecy Act] does not impose
explicit obligations on trustees,” though obligations on trust companies
“exten[d] to their role as trustees.” Id. at 31.
137. Id. at 153.
138. Id.
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a host of measures to mitigate the risks associated with trusts.139 Among
its other recommendations, it argues that the United States should
“[e]nsure that trustees are subject to . . . an explicit obligation to obtain
and hold adequate, accurate and current information on [the] identity
of all parties to trusts, including any other natural person exercising
ultimate effective control over trusts.”140 Thus, renewed attention into
preventing money laundering through trusts appears to be an important
component to stanching the flow of illicit funds through real estate in
the United States.141
E. Limitation to Residential Real Estate

The GTOs have only subjected residential real estate transactions
to additional scrutiny.142 Commercial real estate transactions—all real
estate transactions except for “real property (including individual units
of condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally for the
occupancy of from one to four families”143—are excluded from the GTO
reporting requirements.144 But in terms of the ease with which money
launderers can integrate illicitly obtained funds into the legal financial
system, little differentiates properties “designed principally for the
occupancy of from one to four families” from larger residential real
estate developments, or from commercial properties.145 Like residential
real estate, commercial property “is as attractive to criminals as it is to
any investor” because it is both “functional . . . [and] provides a veneer
of respectability, legitimacy, and normality.”146 FinCEN’s
“disproportionate focus on residential deals may even have

139. See, e.g., id. at 154–55.
140. Id. at 155.
141. Although highlighting the challenges trusts present to the enforcement of
the U.S. AML regime is important to understanding gaps in the GTO
framework, a comprehensive exploration of more effective ways to prevent
the use of trusts as vehicles for laundering money is beyond the scope of
this Note.
142. See, e.g., FinCEN, supra note 35.
143. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(1)(A) (2018).
144. See FinCEN, supra note 35; FinCEN, supra note 30, at 1 n.1 (“Although
FinCEN to date has focused on residential real estate, money laundering
can also involve commercial real estate transactions.”).
145. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 800; Cécile Remeur,
European Parliament Research Serv., Understanding Money
Laundering Through Real Estate Transactions 2 (2019).
146. Remeur, supra note 145 (observing that real estate prices are “generally
stable and likely to appreciate over time” and that properties can be used
both for their instrumental value or to “generat[e] income”).
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unintentionally funneled more fraud into the commercial sector.”147
More than one-quarter of all commercial real estate transactions are
conducted on an all-cash basis, a greater proportion than all-cash
transactions for residential real estate.148
Money launderers have many opportunities to obscure their
identity in complex commercial real estate transactions. Commercial
real estate transactions are “[f]ar more complex than [transactions for]
residential property.”149 FinCEN’s focus on residential properties may
stem from its assessment that financial institutions can more easily
identify suspicious behavior in residential real estate transactions.150
Commercial real estate may be “more vulnerable to abuse” because
commercial real estate transactions routinely feature more “complex
ownership structures” than residential deals.151 Unlike commercial real
estate transactions, “[i]n residential real estate, closings work in a very
systematic way.”152 Commercial real estate transactions “generally
[involve] more parties.”153 Companies engaging in commercial real estate
transactions “usually have more decision makers on both sides of the
deal.”154 The presence of tenants can further complicate commercial real
estate transactions.155 Pricing information is often not readily available
for commercial properties: as many as 70% of commercial properties
147. Katherine Clarke & E.B. Solomont, NYC’s Dirty Money Files, Real
Deal (Oct. 3, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/
nycs-dirty-money-files/ [https://perma.cc/3KT4-PE9L].
148. Compare George Ratiu, Cash Accounts for 26 Percent of Commercial
Transactions in REALTOR® Markets, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors (June
30, 2016), http://economistsoutlook.blogs.realtor.org/2016/06/30/cashaccounts-for-26-percent-of-commercial-transactions-in-realtor-markets/
[https://perma.cc/6ETN-4ZHW], with Scholastica (Gay) Cororaton, Fewer
Cash Sales, Investor Buyers, and Distressed Sales in 2017, Nat’l Ass’n
of Realtors (Feb. 5, 2018), http://economistsoutlook.blogs.realtor.org/
2018/02/05/fewer-cash-sales-investor-buyers-and-distressed-sales-in-2017/
[https://perma.cc/V5FA-7TPB] (noting that all-cash transactions accounted
for 23% of all residential real estate transactions in 2016, and that “[t]he
share of cash sales . . . continued to trend down, to 21[%]in 2017”).
149. Simon Bloom & Shannon Oliver, 10 Pitfalls in Commercial Real Estate
Transactions, Construction Fin. Mgmt. Ass’n (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www
.cfma.org/content.cfm?ItemNumber=5234 [https://perma.cc/7JSX-U2FM].
150. Clarke & Solomont, supra note 147.
151. Id.
152. Differences Between Commercial and Residential Real Estate Transactions,
Landmark Title Assurance Agency (Aug. 3, 2016), https://ltaz.com/
real-estate-tips/commercial-residential-real-estate-transactions [https://
perma.cc/756X-YGWN] (describing the residential real estate transaction
process).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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listed for rent do not have an asking price.156 Against this backdrop,
money launderers may find it easier to overpay for commercial
properties.157 Relative to the challenges posed by residential real
property, regulators remain comparatively ignorant of the extent to
which commercial real estate transactions pose money laundering
risks.158
Thus, the GTOs contain numerous gaps that allow money
launderers to avoid reporting requirements and remain anonymous.
Early evidence suggests that purchasers who wish to remain anonymous
have adjusted their behavior in response to the GTO disclosure
requirements.159 Some of these characteristics, such as the limited
geographic scope and exclusion of non-residential properties, support
broadening the coverage of the title insurance company reporting
requirements. Maintaining and expanding the GTOs’ requirements is
desirable because it would give law enforcement ready access to
information on real estate transactions shortly after they occur.160 But
the challenges presented by parties who avoid title insurance and who
have no single owner with a 25% or greater beneficial ownership interest
are structural limits that preserve anonymity. Because of the inherent
limitations that intermediaries like title insurance companies have in
preventing money laundering through shell companies, denying money
launderers access to the U.S. real estate market will require additional
action. FinCEN can expand the coverage of its real estate rules through

156. Jackie Swift, The Behavior of Commercial Real Estate, Cornell U.:
Cornell Res., https://research.cornell.edu/news-features/behaviorcommercial-real-estate [https://perma.cc/W2XZ-HTNA] (last visited June
27, 2020) (reporting that, in the commercial real estate context, “owners
routinely put buildings on the market without indicating the asking price”).
157. Overpayment is a common money laundering tool. Money launderers have
used similar methods to launder money by overcharging for goods and
services. See, e.g., Joseph A. Mann, Money Launderers Wash Billions
Through International Trade, Miami Herald (May 11, 2009) https://
miamiherald.newsbank.com/doc/news/1281EC27855DB3F8?search_ter
ms=Money+launderers+wash+billions+through+international+trade&t
ext=Money launderers wash billions through international trade&pub%
5B0%5D=MIHB&pdate=2009-05-11 [https://perma.cc/5FNN-ZRHM]
(“[M]y partner in Latin America spends $1,000 to buy 10,000 pencils at
[ten] cents each and ships them to me in Miami. The invoice says the
pencils are worth $100 each[;] I pay my partner $1 million. That way, I’m
able to move $1 million out of the country.”). The same basic mechanism
for laundering money through goods and services can extend to
overpayment for real estate.
158. See Terrorism, Transnat’l Crime & Corruption Ctr., Money
Laundering in Real Estate 39 (2018).
159. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 19.
160. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520 (2018) (requiring financial institutions and
government agencies to share information with one another).
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rulemaking, but complementary legislative action is needed to deny
anonymity to shell company owners.
Rather than focus exclusively on preventing real estate-based
money laundering through financial institutions, a legislative solution
that requires shell companies to identify their beneficial owners to the
federal government would provide better, broader, and more useful
information to law enforcement.

IV. Legislative Solutions
Information generated by the GTOs targeting residential real estate
sales supports the view that individuals who seek anonymity are
rational actors who are willing to change their behavior to preserve that
anonymity.161 The public interest in affording this particular species of
anonymity to individuals, however, is negligible; whereas the risks are
considerable.162 Federal law already protects the privacy of consumer
financial data.163 Furthermore, the Department of the Treasury can
impose penalties on financial institutions that fail to safeguard customer
privacy.164 As the technological and logistical hurdles to identifying
beneficial owners have become less onerous in the decades since the
161. See generally Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87; Nicholas Gilmour,
Understanding the Practices Behind Money Laundering—A Rational
Choice Interpretation, 44 Int’l J.L. Crime & Justice 1 (2016); Alberto
Chong & Florencio López-de-Silanes, Money Laundering and its
Regulations 6 (Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper No.
590, 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820066
[https://perma.cc/8J98-Q8L2] (“If money launderers are rational profitmaximizers, like other criminals, deterrence is essential in order to curtail
their behavior.”).
162. Jodi Vittori, How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents,
Criminals, and Dictators, Ctr. for Security Studies (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/
cc9d6a76-aec2-442b-892e-92825a7dbdd1 [https://perma.cc/6V9W-S4CM]
(“Because of the secrecy they can provide, anonymous companies represent
an important nexus of corruption, money laundering, transnational organized
crime, and terrorism, which directly harm U.S. interests.”).
163. See FinCEN, Feasibility of a Cross-Border Electronic Funds
Transfer Reporting System under the Bank Secrecy Act 23
(2006) (discussing the laws that “control the collection and use of data by
government agencies with the aim of protecting the privacy of individual
persons”), available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=472174 [https://
perma.cc/9NGT-VTE6]; see also Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2018); Federal Information Security Management Act
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–49 (2018); Bank Secrecy Act,
31 U.S.C. § 5319 (2018).
164. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2018); Robert W. Anderson, Federal Data
Privacy and Cybersecurity Laws, Lindabury (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.lindabury.com/firm/articles-resources/federal-data-privacycybersecurity-laws.html [https://perma.cc/K7NN-L6QE].
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enactment of the BSA and the USA PATRIOT Act, the anonymity
beneficial owners enjoy appears not to be a policy worth preserving for
its own sake but simply a historical accident stemming from the
difficulty of obtaining that information.165 Contrasted with other
desirable shell company attributes—such as limited liability,
preferential tax treatment, and estate planning benefits—it is difficult
to find independent grounds to justify beneficial owner anonymity from
governmental agencies as a public virtue.166 This is especially true
because American business entities are creations of the states.167
By only permitting FinCEN to impose requirements on financial
institutions, the BSA limits the scope of federal action.168 Even within
the range of potential actions available under existing law, FinCEN has
been cautious to avoid promulgating burdensome rules.169 Through the
GTOs, FinCEN has emphasized small, easily attainable goals in its
efforts to reduce money laundering through real estate.170 But these
165. See Fin. Action Task Force, Transparency and Beneficial Owner–
ship 7 (2014) (noting that “company structures that promote complexity
and increase the difficulty for authorities to obtain accurate beneficial
ownership information (e.g., shell companies and bearer shares)” may
pose greater money laundering risks), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-transparency-beneficialownership.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HXX-WVZH].
166. See, e.g., Metcalfe, supra note 40; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89,
107–08 (1985) (arguing that limited liability encourages risk-averse investors
to engage in productive enterprise). An important distinction should be
drawn between privacy from the general public and privacy from federal
agencies like FinCEN. Valid policy concerns support maintaining
anonymity from the general public, as “[t]here are numerous cases in
which foreign taxpayers have been attacked and even killed when outside
parties have learned about their particular holdings and assets.” See
Metcalfe, supra note 40, at 253. Any attempt to deny anonymity to
beneficial owners must account for the competing interest in allowing
individuals to keep their affairs private from their neighbors while
permitting the government to collect valuable information to identify
potential money launderers.
167. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational
Corporations, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 283, 293 (1990) (describing a view of
corporations as “a separate juridical unit created by state action, an
artificial creature of the state possessing in addition to its essential ‘core’
attributes only such limited powers as are granted by the state”); Carliss
N. Chatman, The Corporate Personhood Two-Step, 18 Nev. L.J. 811, 812
(2018) (“Corporations are defined by state law, and have rights incidental
to that status. Corporations also have rights defined by statutes.”).
168. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2018).
169. See Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81
Fed. Reg. 29,398, 29,408–15 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R.
pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, and 1026).
170. Clarke & Solomont, supra note 147.
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easily attainable goals reflect a small subsection of all real estate-based
money laundering; and they have displaced, rather than reduced or
eliminated, behaviors consistent with money laundering through real
estate.171
Some states have engaged in an anonymity-promoting “race to the
bottom.”172 Delaware, Wyoming, and Nevada “have resisted the
imposition of increased transparency and oversight mechanisms.”173
Unlike larger states, which “persist in viewing corporation laws as
complex moral and political problems,” smaller states like Delaware
have viewed corporate laws as “a way of making everybody rich.”174
Because states have strong financial incentives to promote company
formation under their laws, individual states are unlikely to lead the
charge for corporate transparency.175
Federal legislative action is thus the best candidate for meaningfully
reducing money laundering through real estate. Since 2008, numerous
bills have attempted to address the anonymity that allows money
laundering to thrive.176 The 2019 iteration of the Corporate
171. Hundtofte & Rantala, supra note 87, at 21.
172. Michel, supra note 44, at 3 (“America’s transformation into a haven for
financial anonymity has arisen in no small part due to the efforts of a
handful of . . . state-level governments.”); Tax Justice Network,
Financial Secrecy Index 2018: Narrative Report on USA 1, 6 (2018).
173. Michel, supra note 44, at 16 (noting that these jurisdictions “have jumpstarted the U.S.’s transformation into a stalwart of financial secrecy and
obscurantism”).
174. Id. (quoting L.J. Davis, Delaware Inc., N.Y. Times (June 5, 1988),
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/05/magazine/delaware-inc.html?
pagewanted=all&mtrref=undefined [https://perma.cc/5Y2G-4LNB]).
175. Tax Justice Network, supra note 172 (noting that, “from the states’
perspectives, the end game is to raise revenue for the state by creaming
off fees from large numbers of companies incorporating there—and the
consequences for everyone else are not considered: a typical offshore
attitude,” and that “[t]he lobbying and the revenue-raising potential and
the lack of strong democratic counterweights in small states[] mean that
these places can be fairly described as ‘captured states’”). But see Michel,
supra note 44, at 16–17 (noting that “the growing media focus on
Delaware’s incorporation regulations” has led Delaware legislators to
“push to build new transparency mechanisms within their incorporation
industry,” but acknowledging that “financial secrecy experts have
described Delaware’s pledged changes as little more than ‘windowdressing’”); Clark Gascoigne, Delaware Bills ‘Mere Window-Dressing,’
Will Do Nothing to Curb Abuse of Anonymous Companies, Global Fin.
Integrity (June 10, 2014), https://www.gfintegrity.org/press-release/
delaware-bills-mere-window-dressing-will-nothing-curb-abuse-anonymouscompanies/ [https://perma.cc/G8HN-E3AB].
176. See Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S.
2956, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 569, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 6098, 111th
Cong. (2010); S. 1483, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3416, 112th Cong. (2011);
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Transparency Act would require “corporations and LLCs . . . to
disclose their beneficial owners to . . . FinCEN, which would then share
that information with law enforcement and financial institutions.”177
The Corporate Transparency Act specifically targets shell companies,
excluding several company types from disclosure requirements.178
But despite bipartisan support for legislation that would compel
shell companies to disclose the identities of their beneficial owners,
Congress has not enacted any of the bills that would accomplish this
goal.179 Disagreements over the appropriate channels through which to
compel disclosure appear to be at least partly responsible for the
impasse. The True Incorporation Transparency of Law Enforcement
(TITLE) Act180 would require states, as opposed to federal agencies, to
collect beneficial ownership information at the time of a company’s
formation, and would expand the definition of financial institutions
under the BSA to include “any person engaged in the business of
forming corporations or limited liability companies.”181 A competing
S. 1465, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 3331, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 2489,
114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 4450, 114th Cong. (2016); True Incorporation
Transparency for Law Enforcement Act, S. 1454, 115th Cong. (2017);
Corporate Transparency Act, H.R. 3089, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 1717,
115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 2513, 116th Cong. (2019).
177. Kevin Sun & David Jeans, Congress Re-examines Bill that Would Expose
Beneficial Owners of LLCs, Real Deal (Mar. 13, 2019, 6:15 PM),
https://therealdeal.com/2019/03/13/congress-re-examines-bill-that-wouldexpose-beneficial-owners-of-llcs/ [https://perma.cc/M2XJ-XD7F]; see also
Corporate Transparency Act, H.R. 2513.
178. Sun & Jeans, supra note 177. The Corporate Transparency Act proposes
to exempt most businesses that are regulated by other disclosurecompelling rules, including businesses subject to, for example, the
Securities Exchange Act or the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, among
others. H.R. 2513 § 5333(d)(4)(C). The Corporate Transparency Act
would also exempt businesses with “a physical office within the United
States” that “employs more than [twenty] employees on a full-time basis
in the United States” and conducts more than $5 million in business. Id.
§ 5333(d)(4)(C)(xiv). Theoretically, these carve-outs define shell companies
by what they are not, and do not exempt businesses whose decision
makers are subject to other anonymity-denying regulations.
179. Shruti Shah, Six Bills in Congress (so far) Target Anonymous Companies,
Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Blog (Aug. 9, 2017, 7:28 AM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/8/9/shruti-shah-six-bills-in-congress-sofar-target-anonymous-co.html [https://perma.cc/4HZJ-QLR2].
180. S. 1454, 115th Cong. (2017).
181. Shah, supra note 179; S. 1454, 115th Cong. § 4(a)(3)(Z) (2017); Sun &
Jeans, supra note 177. The TITLE Act would condition funding offered
to states under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
program on requiring that form “a corporation or limited liability
company to provide information about its beneficial owners.” Summary:
True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement Act or the TITLE
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proposal “would designate the Internal Revenue Service [as] the point
of collection instead” of FinCEN, ostensibly because “this would be a
more efficient way of collecting [beneficial ownership] information.”182
But critics of this proposal have noted that this would require law
enforcement “to obtain a search warrant to coordinate with the Internal
Revenue Service” to identify the beneficial owners of shell companies.183
The competing bills primarily disagree over questions of efficiency.
Because states could condition the formation of business entities on
receiving identifying information about beneficial ownership, states
stand in a strong position to collect that information in the first
instance. But the TITLE Act would require states to give beneficial
ownership information to FinCEN only upon a written request.184 The
TITLE Act does not specify whether such requests would need to be
tailored to individual companies or whether FinCEN could make
blanket requests to obtain all beneficial ownership information in a
state’s possession.185 The TITLE Act’s focus on regulating shell
companies by expanding the definition of financial institutions risks a
narrow regulatory interpretation of “person engaged in the business of
forming corporations or limited liability companies” that would
undermine the efficacy of the legislation to identify all beneficial owners
of shell companies.186 Moreover, resting the responsibility for collecting
beneficial ownership information with states creates the risk that
inconsistent approaches to information collection will impede FinCEN’s
ability to assist law enforcement in fast-moving criminal investigations.
Furthermore, states hoping to differentiate themselves as secrecy
havens could simply choose to forego the funding available under the
TITLE Act. The TITLE Act thus contains numerous shortcomings that
undermine its ability to prevent anonymous shell company ownership.
Similarly, requiring the IRS to collect beneficial ownership
information makes a degree of intuitive sense. Unlike with FinCEN,

Act, Congress.gov, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/1454 [https://perma.cc/UJ56-APRD] (last visited June 27, 2020).
182. Sun & Jeans, supra note 177.
183. House Financial Services Subcommittee Hearing on Proposals to Detect
and Deter Financial Crimes, Sec. Industry & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (Mar.
13, 2019), https://www.sifma.org/resources/general/house-financial-servicessubcommittee-hearing-on-proposals-to-detect-and-deter-financial-crimes/
[https://perma.cc/9EQ8-RXPM].
184. S. 1454 § 531(a)(1)(D)(iii).
185. See id.
186. See S. 1454 § 4(a)(3)(Z). Without a robust definition that requires everyone
who forms or registers a corporation, limited liability company, or other
business entity to disclose beneficial ownership information, the TITLE
Act proposal risks encountering the same shortcomings as requiring title
insurance companies to collect beneficial ownership information.
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companies routinely file documents with the IRS.187 But without
modification, the logistical impediments to effective law enforcement
would be even more pronounced, as FinCEN would otherwise require
search warrants to obtain beneficial ownership information.188
Rather than address the problem of anonymous beneficial
ownership through financial institutions, which have proven to be
imperfect proxies in the quest to root out illicit actors,189 an approach
that requires shell companies to identify beneficial owners on the threat
of civil and criminal penalties cuts to the heart of the issue. The
Corporate Transparency Act would accomplish this goal, albeit through
the logistically puzzling mechanism of requiring covered companies to
report directly to FinCEN.190 Requiring companies to file paperwork
directly with FinCEN could easily become a trap for the unwary,
exposing to civil and criminal liability parties who pose little-to-no
money laundering risk. Moreover, the IRS already collects large
amounts of information from the public.191 Congress could easily resolve
this tension through a small statutory tweak. Namely, Congress could
require shell companies to submit identifying information for beneficial
owners to the IRS at regular intervals while also requiring the IRS to
share that identifying information with FinCEN. Not only would this
approach minimize the burden on those who use shell companies for
legitimate purposes, it would allow FinCEN ready access to data that
would both support ongoing investigations into financial crimes and
enable FinCEN to develop quantitative models of shell company
behavior. In this sense, splitting the difference between FinCEN and
the IRS would produce better outcomes for both the public and law
enforcement. Requiring shell companies to produce the identity of their
beneficial ownership could also facilitate the due diligence efforts of
other financial institutions.192 And requiring shell companies to identify
their own beneficial owners would theoretically reduce the burden of
identifying individuals who own a smaller portion of the shell company;
thus increasing the difficulty that money launderers would face in
187. See Sun & Jeans, supra note 177; The Agency, its Mission and Statutory
Authority, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-agency-its-mission-andstatutory-authority [https://perma.cc/8FB3-DLYS] (last updated Feb.
26, 2020) (“In fiscal year 2015, the IRS collected almost $3.3 trillion in
revenue and processed almost 240 million tax returns.”).
188. See House Financial Services Subcommittee Hearing on Proposals to Detect
and Deter Financial Crimes, supra note 183.
189. See id.
190. H.R. 2513, 116th Cong. § 5333(a)(1)(A) (2019). Requiring shell companies to
report information directly to FinCEN would logically increase the burden
on those who create and maintain shell companies by requiring them to
file paperwork with an additional government agency.
191. The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, supra note 187.
192. Shah, supra note 179.
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skirting reporting requirements by distributing ownership so that no
one beneficial owner owns more than 25% of the company.193
Significantly, requiring shell companies to report their beneficial
owners to a federal agency under the Corporate Transparency Act
would ameliorate concerns about AML regulations interfering with the
attorney-client relationship and the duty of confidentiality. Whereas
the American Bar Association objected to the Incorporation
Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act on the grounds
that it would expand the BSA’s definition of “financial institutions” to
include “formation agents,”194 the Corporate Transparency Act would
create a duty for shell companies, not the lawyers who serve them, to
disclose beneficial ownership information.195 Rather than incorporating
attorneys into the AML regulation system in a way that could interfere
with their professional obligations, the Corporation Transparency Act
framework goes to the source of shell company anonymity without
implicating attorneys’ professional-responsibility concerns.
Gaps would still remain under this proposal. Despite the proposed
penalties for failing to disclose updated beneficial ownership
information, money launderers may well give inaccurate, misleading, or
incomplete ownership information.196 Money launderers could come to
rely more heavily on straw buyers—individuals “who allow [their] name,
identifiers, and credit rating to be used to . . . purchase . . . real
property.”197 But because these gaps are already the subject of AML
193. See supra note 83 (discussing the beneficial ownership threshold which
triggers reporting requirements under the Nov. 2018 GTO).
194. Letter from Paulette Brown, President, American Bar Association, to
Michael G. Fitzpatrick and Stephen F. Lynch (May 24, 2016), available
at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/
2016may24_gatekeeperregandtheprofession.authcheckdam.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E5QZ-GG87].
195. H.R. 2531 § 5333(a)(1)(A).
196. See J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the
“Incorporation Transparency Act”, 70 La. L. Rev. 857, 909 (2010)
(arguing that the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement
Assistance Act “is founded on an erroneous assumption of reliable selfreporting of ownership information from individuals who are simultaneously
engaged in fraud”). This same basic criticism applies to all self-reporting
requirements. But Verret’s argument loses its persuasive gusto when selfreporting requirements are characterized not as ways to obtain perfect
information from dishonest actors, but as ways to limit the extent to
which these actors can use legal services to carry out their objectives.
197. FinCEN, Suspected Money Laundering in the Residential Real
Estate Industry 1 n.3 (2008) (Though the term “straw buyer” has
historically referred to individuals who obtain mortgages on property on
behalf of an undisclosed party, the underlying principle is the same
regardless of how the property is financed: “The straw buyer generally
understands that he will neither occupy the property nor make payments
on [a] loan,” and “is general paid a fee” by the putative fraudster).
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and law-enforcement investigative methods and reflect a degree of
dishonesty that would ordinarily require a more detailed, contextual
understanding of parties to any given transaction, the gaps are unlikely
to be solved through changes in a reporting regime. Rather, beneficial
ownership reporting would supplement existing AML regulations and
law-enforcement strategies. Mandatory beneficial ownership reporting
need not replace the duties FinCEN imposes on title companies to
report on all-cash transactions because title insurance companies might
still encounter suspicious behavior indicative of criminal conduct.
Instead, mandatory beneficial ownership reporting would emphasize the
role of shell companies while reducing the comparative burdens on title
insurance companies. Requiring shell companies to report their
beneficial ownership while also requiring title companies to report
suspicious activity to FinCEN for commercial and residential real estate
transactions would reflect a significantly more robust AML regime.
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